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GLOBALIZATION
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This article re-examines the field of comparative law and
comparative legal studies through the lens of feminist legal
theories/studies (FLT). It suggests that lessons learned from the
development of FLT and insights from shared epistemology and
methodology within FLT can inform the ongoing controversies within
comparative legal studies and provide comparative legal scholars
and practitioners with the tools to maximize the benefits of
comparative legal studies in the era of increasing global
interdependence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years of planning and teaching Comparative Law
Seminar (renamed Comparative Legal Studies Seminar), I often
struggle to explain to myself and to the students what the course is
about and what our learning objectives are. It is similarly difficult to
find reading materials that successfully answer those questions.'
Much of both classical and contemporary comparative legal
scholarship side-steps those issues altogether or addresses them
briefly at best. Additionally, amongst the contemporary comparative
law scholars that have raised key existential questions on the nature
of the discipline few have been able to provide satisfactory answers.
While scholars have tried to offer critical perspectives on
comparative practice, that scholarship has mostly been invisible
among mainstream comparativists, and not too many critical "new
voices" have emerged since the two symposia issues published in
1997 and 1998 by the Utah Law Review and the American Journal of
Comparative Law respectively. 2
1. At least amongst U.S. scholarship or other English based scholarship. See
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin Orctici & David Nelken, eds., 2007).
2. In October 1996, the University of Utah College of Law sponsored the Utah Law
Review Symposium entitled "New Approaches to Comparative Law." Symposium,
New Approaches to Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 255, 255 (1997)
[hereinafter Symposium, New Approaches to Comparative Law]. Also in 1996 and
1997, two conferences at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor and a year later at
the Hastings College of Law resulted in a symposium issue on "New Directions in
Comparative Law" published by the American Journal of Comparative Law. See
Symposium, New Directions in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 597, 598-99
(1998) [hereinafter Symposium, New Directions in Comparative Law]. A 2009
symposium issue published by Brigham Young University Law Review on "Evaluating
Legal Origins Theory" continues the strand of mainstream comparative legal
scholarship focused on comparative economics developed within law and economics
scholarship. See Symposium, Evaluating Legal Origin Theory, 2009 BYU L. REV.
1413 (2009). Two other recent symposia organized by the American Society of
Comparative Law offer some better approaches in problematizing key issues within
comparative law discourse: Euro-centrism and methodology. The 2008 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, held at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, focused on "The West and the Rest in
Comparative Law." Several of the conference papers were later published in Volume
32 of the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review. See 32 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 765 (2009). The 2009 American Society of Comparative
Law's Annual Conference, held at the Roger Williams University School of Law,
similarly examined issues facing new and young comparativists, especially on
methodological concerns. Proceedings from that conference were published in
Volume 16 of the Roger Williams University Law Review. See 16 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 1, 86 (2011). Neither issue, however, offers significant new lines of
inquiry to address these issues. Lastly, a 2007 comparative law textbook, including
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At the same time, and maybe partially due to the lack of
satisfactory answers to these key questions, numerous comparative
law projects today all around the world proceed with a very
pragmatic practical stance and with very little theorizing about the
meaning of engaging in a comparative endeavor. While this article
does not suggest that we cannot engage in comparative inquiry
without understanding the broader theoretical implications, it does
suggest that developing such theory can both problematize the uses of
comparative law, as well as better facilitate its various uses.
In thinking anew about comparative law and comparative legal
studies, I found myself drawing comparisons between the state of
comparative law discourse and practice and the ongoing debates and
controversies amongst feminist legal scholars with whom I have
aligned in prior scholarship. Issues of substance versus method,
similarities and differences, essentialism and imperialism, the
production of knowledge and political dimensions are core to both
areas. Yet, while these issues have either been marginalized in
comparative law discourse or have simply bogged down further
development of comparative law theory, feminist legal scholars have
not only tackled these issues head on but have also developed
promising new approaches to move us forward. Consequently, this
article looks at comparative legal studies expressly' through the lens
of feminist legal theories/studies (FLT).4 It attempts to look fresh at
some of the key questions posed by comparative scholars and answer
contributions from mostly European contributors, attempts to offer nuanced analysis
of contemporary problems in comparative legal studies. COMPARATIVE LAW: A
HANDBOOK, supra note 1.
3. Several of the then "new voices" represented in the 1997 Utah Symposium have no
doubt brought the tools of feminist, critical, and post-colonial theories into the work
of comparative law, and their ideas are utilized significantly in this article. See
Symposium, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 2. At the same time,
fifteen years later, this work is yet to inform and transform contemporary comparative
law work. With the state of comparative law in even more need of urgent care
nowadays, this paper seeks to re-energize critical comparative law by tying their
concepts together and broadening them through a concerted effort to link with current
feminist legal theories. See discussion infra Parts II-VI.
4. See discussion infra Parts II-VI. While this field of inquiry is widely known as
feminist legal theories (FLT), the term "feminist legal studies" more accurately reflect
the feminist insight that theory and practice inform and constitute each other. FLT in
particular is informed by the real lived experiences of women, and challenges the
epistemology of abstract theoretical knowing.
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them by learning from the experience of FLT scholarship and
practice.'
Part II begins by briefly reviewing key controversies and critiques
within comparative legal studies. It highlights the debate on whether
comparative law encompasses a substantive area of law or is merely a
method of inquiry, to suggest that FLT's efforts to move beyond
similar dichotomies can help comparative legal studies regain
relevance both in theory and in practice. It raises the question of
whether comparativists should focus on similarities or differences
amongst legal systems and the problems presented by comparative
law's struggle with the relationship between relativism/multi-
culturalism and universalism, especially in light of tensions between
the "West" and the "Rest" and despite efforts to infuse comparative
legal studies with attention to historical, social, and political contexts.
Similarly, Part II highlights an area of more recent critique among
comparativists regarding comparative law's traditional focus on
private law areas. The article will argue in later parts that FLT
deconstruction of binary dualisms such as similarity versus difference
and private versus public can bring important insights to these
concerns within comparative legal studies.
Part III offers a critical examination of comparative law's treatment
of similarities and differences and brings to the forefront a discourse
of the "Other." It relies on feminist and critical race theories'
challenges to the social and legal construction of sameness and
difference-challenges to the dichotomization of self and other-in
order to assist comparative law in unpacking otherness. It calls on
comparativists to recognize that similarities and differences are not
mere observable facts but are to a large extent socially construed and,
more importantly, in the service of certain ideologies and political
agenda. Part IV complements Part III by examining the essentialist
and ethnocentric stance from which most comparativists have
construed similarities and differences. It suggests that comparativists
can negotiate both essentialism and relativism by adopting feminist
approaches calling for consciousness-shifting and fluid positioning
that intentionally sees the world from multiple points of view.
Part V consequently offers a broader critique of the stance of
universal objectivity that comparative law often presupposes and
perpetuates, and builds on feminist jurisprudence about the
5. Cf Adrien Katherine Wing, Conceptualizing Global Substantive Justice in the Age of
Obama, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 705, 711 (2010) (arguing that comparative law,
among other subfields of public international law, stands to benefit from critical race
theories).
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production of knowledge and objectivity as epistemology. It
challenges the dichotomy between knowledge (substance) and how
we come to know (methodology/epistemology) and exposes its
connection to oppressive male power and ideology. It suggests that
comparative work can benefit greatly from a critical attitude towards
alleged universal categories and claims to authenticity by questioning
the neutrality of the comparison and by taking account of the impact
of the self and the observer's perspective and experience on our
comparisons.
Finally, Part VI calls for acknowledging comparative law as
political practice, whether in the ways in which it "finds" similarities
and differences and uses them to legitimize certain legal frameworks,
or in the ways in which it construes and perpetuates private law, the
distinction between private and public, and law in general as a-
political, non-ideological, and divorced from power structures within
society. It uses FLT's explicit discourse of law as political practice,
as an ideology of power, to call on those engaged in comparative
legal studies and in comparative projects to be self-critical and
recognize the power relations involved, whether we engage in
harmonization and rule of law projects or in the seemingly mere
intellectual projects of understanding and migration of ideas and legal
concepts.
II. COMPARATIVE LAW IN CRISIS
"Comparative law has often been criticized for lacking in theory,
Euro-centric, and black-letter-law and private law oriented," states
the preface of a current handbook on comparative law.' Others
observe that "comparative law is in need of an overhaul."' Yet, as
evident from numerous academic courses, scholarly articles, and field
projects, "[i]n our increasingly globally linked world, comparative
law needs to take on an ever more important role."'
Critics of the current state of comparative law abound, both from
outside and from within the discipline. Many scholars find the
continued focus of mainstream comparative law on "function,
efficiency, or linear history" to be unsatisfactory.' Others observe
that comparative law is "a mainly ethnocentric enterprise without
6. COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at v.
7. Edward J. Eberle, The Methodology of Comparative Law, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REv. 51, 72 (2011).
8. Id. at 5 1.
9. Igor Stramignoni, The King's One Too Many Eyes: Language, Thought, and
Comparative Law, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 739, 739.
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self-critical discipline that usually generated boredom rather than
excitement.""o And as David Snyder put it: "Over the years, and
particularly in the last decade, comparative law has been criticized
for excessive doctrinalism, shuttered attitudes to interdisciplinary
inquiry, timidity in approaching broad-gauge study, as well as
tendencies to superficiality, triviality, obscurantism, and
exoticization-not to mention claims of ultimate irrelevance.""
While the nature of comparative law has been changing 2 in
response to some of these critiques, these changes have only
highlighted the existential angst of comparative law scholars,
teachers, and users. The big questions vexing the discipline are at the
forefront these days more than ever. Reflecting on comparative law
in the age of globalization, William Twining criticizes comparative
law for lacking adequate analytical concepts and tools to account for
and "comprehend the transnationalisation of law and legal
relations."" In addition to criticizing comparative law's narrow
focus on state-based European private law, Twining calls for moving
to a broader agenda of comparative legal studies in light of other
research traditions.14
A. The Need to Move Beyond the Subject Matter v. Method Debate
A threshold issue which itself occupies and shapes much of the
debate amongst comparativists has to do with the question of subject
matter versus method: "Does [comparative law] have a proper
subject-matter, or is it no more than a method?"" Esin Orficti
suggests that the identity of comparative law is pulled between these
two alternatives. 6 Some view comparative law as "an autonomous
branch of social science or science of legal knowledge," as "a high
level analytical subject" and "an end in itself."" Those scholars
engage in comparative law in order to learn about legal rules and
institutions in other jurisdictions, in order to understand other
10. Ginter Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in Comparative Law,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 259, 260.
11. David V. Snyder, Comparative Law: Problems and Prospects, 26 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 935, 936 (2011).
12. Esin Orikic, Developing Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, at 43.
13. William Twining, Globalization and Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 69, 75-77.
14. Id. at 84-85.
15. David Nelken, Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies, in COMPARATIVE
LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 3, 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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societies (and one's own society) through law, in order to search for
commonalities or in order to show differences and the difficulty of
understanding and experiencing other people's law, regardless of any
practical goals or uses of such knowledge.' 8  In contrast, much
current comparative law scholarship and practice utilizes comparative
law as a method of obtaining knowledge for specific practical aims
such as for harmonization projects and convergence of legal rules, for
legislative and judicial transplantation of foreign legal rules and
models, and for large scale development and law reform agendas."
The explicit debate viewing substance and method as in direct
competition with each other has somewhat subsided,2 0 since most
contemporary comparativists have embraced a pragmatic pluralistic
approach towards both the multiple purposes of comparative law and
practice and the various comparative methods that can be employed
in pursuing those goals.2' That pluralism, I would argue, merely
represents a pragmatic compromise. By not exploring and fully
embracing how comparative method and substance mutually
constitute each other and further each other, comparativists have
given up on the truly radical and transformative potential of
comparative law. We can learn from the experience of feminist
jurisprudence. Rather than viewing substance and method or theory
and practice in a binary fashion, it has successfully employed
theoretical investigations with real life concerns and advocacy to
advance its political agendas.2 2 As we shall see,23 FLT is most
relevant and most transformative when it challenges the dichotomy
between knowledge (substance) and how we come to know
(methodology/epistemology).
B. What to Compare: Debates on Similarities and Differences and
Criticism of Comparative Law's Focus on Private Law Areas
Broadly speaking, the two core questions occupying comparative
law scholars are: What to compare? and How to compare? 24 As we
shall see, each of these questions needs to be unpacked and critically
examined for its methodological, epistemological, and substantive
18. Id.
19. Id. at 43.
20. Nelken, supra note 15, at 12-13 ("It is over this terrain that a territorial war between
comparative law and comparative legal studies is being fought.").
21. See OricOi, supra note 12, at 53.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.
24. Oracti, supra note 12, at 62.
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implications. For example, a key issue within comparative law
revolves around looking for similarities and differences between laws
and legal systems.2 5 Harmonization and convergence projects seek to
highlight similarities and advance seemingly universal principles in
law.2 6 On the other hand, many comparativists express concern with
overlooking local values, traditions and cultural approaches that
"differently colour the definition of those functions" of legal rules
and institutions, "the importance attached to them and the test of their
successful fulfillment." 27
The concern for differences in comparative law resonates with
broader debates about multi-culturalism, essentialism (Western,
white, male), and assimilation. Comparative law continues to
struggle with the relationship between relativism/multi-culturalism
and universalism. 28 Nowhere has this tension been more evident as in
comparative law approaches to rule of law and development
29projects, or with regard to human rights." Asian, African, and other
non-Western comparative legal scholars and practitioners are acutely
conscious of how the traditional legal system classifications, such as
the prevalent civil-law/common-law classification, focus heavily on
private law, on law as rules, and are "too Euro-centric."31 In contrast,
their experience points to legal pluralism and to understanding legal
systems as dynamic and manipulatable in nature.32
Similarly, feminist legal scholars and advocates build on their lived
experiences as women, as women of color, and as women at the
intersection of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and the like.
These lived experiences challenge the objective universal fagade of
law and legal rules and deconstruct traditional dichotomies of private
and public spheres, of objectivity and subjectivity, and of similarities
25. Roger Cotterrell, Is it so Bad to be Different? Comparative Law and the Appreciation
ofDiversity, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 133, 134.
26. Id. at 134-35.
27. Id. at 136.
28. Id. at 137.
29. See, e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 10, at 270-74 (describing the conflicted Professor
Y, a Western European scholar serving as a legal consultant to a codification project
in post-soviet Eastern Europe).
30. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights, in
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 371, 371-74 (examining the
tensions in the relationship between comparative law and human rights law).
31. Nelken, supra note 15, at 7; see Esin Orticti, A General View of 'Legal Families' and
of 'Mixing Systems', in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 169, 170-
71, 181.
32. Nelken, supra note 15, at 8.
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and differences.33 These insights can, and should, assist comparative
law address the similar issues facing it.34
Another area of more recent concern among comparativists has
been comparative law's traditional focus on private law areas, which
meant that areas such as family law were not considered proper
subject to comparative investigation. While subjects such as contract
law and property law are viewed as inherently a-cultural or a-
historical, where perceived differences can be overcome as there is a
common core amongst all legal systems that can be harmonized,
areas such as family law or other matters of personal status are
viewed as tied to historical and cultural specificities that are not
suitable for harmonization or transplantation between legal systems.35
Recent scholarship is beginning to challenge that assumption,36 as
well as the universalist culture-neutral pretense of so called "private"
law, such as commercial law." Nicholas Foster, for example,
stresses the importance of legal culture and history in understanding
the differences in the operation of and attitudes towards commercial
law even amongst countries otherwise viewed as belonging to the
same legal family." Here as well, comparative law can benefit
greatly from feminist critique of the family, the market, the private
sphere, and the public sphere.39 Post-modern feminist deconstruction
of the private-public dualism and its connection to power relation and
social domination is particularly poignant as we begin to investigate
the relations between comparative law, knowledge, and the politics of
power.40
33. See infra Parts III-IV.
34. See infra Parts III-IV.
35. See Orticti, A General View of 'Legal Families' and of 'Mixing Systems', supra note
31, at 170-72, 181. Thus, most migration of legal rules and institutions, whether
through involuntary adoption of a certain legal system during a period of colonization
or through voluntary borrowing, often left in place pre-existing legal regimes of
matters of personal status, especially when based in historical customs or religion.
36. See, e.g., Masha Antokolskaia, Comparative Family Law: Moving with the Times?, in
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 241, 241-58 (acknowledging that
differences remain, but nonetheless offers a vision of family law that builds on
transnational notions of human rights and women's rights).
37. See, e.g., Nicholas HD Foster, Comparative Commercial Law: Rules or Context?, in
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 263, 263-80 (discussing the
significance of incorporating commercial law into comparative legal studies and
providing specific accounts of the way history and culture shapes commercial law of
differing countries).
38. See id. at 277-79.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. See infra Part V.
357
University of Baltimore Law Review
C. What and How to Compare: Putting Law in Context
Deciding which aspects of a legal system are similar enough and
hence comparable to another legal system depends on how we view
law more broadly. In asking "What and how to compare?,"
mainstream contemporary comparativists have followed the legal
realists' insights into law and call for the expansion of the scope of
comparative inquiry from a formalistic approach, limited to law on
the books only, to a contextual approach examining how law operates
within society. Classical comparative law has focused not only on
private law but also on a very narrow concept of law: law as formal
positive legal rules, such as black-letter law on the books.4 1 Much
has been said about the need to move beyond legal rules and for
looking at law in context.42 A contextual approach examines the
interpretation and application of law in practice-law in action-and
facilitates a "better understanding of law and lawyers from other
jurisdictions. "4 Even more so, looking to context takes into account
the experience of those using the law and those to whom the law is
addressed, and allows us "to reach the realities of all forms of law as
social practices."
Current comparative scholarship is rich with examples of "putting
law in context," for example, understanding law within a wider
social, political, and economic context.4 5 As a matter of fact, it can
be said that such contextual approach is at the core of comparative
law's functional approach." A functionalist comparative
investigation assumes that law has a social purpose; consequently, a
functionalist comparative approach seeks to discover "how different
legal systems deal with similar types of [problems] in the context of
their own societies" and to compare institutions that perform
41. Orici, Developing Comparative Law, supra note 12, at 45.
42. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 7, 51-64 (arguing that "law ... cannot be understood
without understanding the culture on which it sits").
43. Foster, supra note 37, 279-80; see Eberle, supra note 7, at 52.
44. Twining, supra note 13, at 77; see William Ewald, The Jurisprudential Approach to
Comparative Law: A Field Guide to "Rats, " 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 704-05 (1998);
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143
U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1973-74 (1995) (advancing the argument that in order to see how
lawyers think in their own legal systems we need to compare law from the insider's
point of view).
45. Nelken, supra note 15, at 21.
46. Id. at 22.
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equivalent functions, whether or not similarly structured and whether
legal or non-legal solutions.4 7
It is safe to say that all comparativists are now "realists" in that it is
widely accepted that any comparative endeavor, whether for
intellectual or for practical purposes, should examine law in its
broader operational social context. For the most part, however,
mainstream comparativists do not challenge the meaning of "context"
itself.48 One challenge of examining law in action, law in context, is
"how to justify the choice of any given context."4 9 "Any choice to
base our contextual explanations on one time or space rather than
another carries implications and is rarely 'innocent."'o Rarely do
comparative scholars take the time to explain such choices. For
some, this may be ideologically driven and for others the result of
their own blindness to the fact that what they view as the neutral state
of things is in fact informed by their own experiences and place in
society."
More importantly, however, even those who put law in context
often ignore the other way of relating law and context-that of
finding the context in law.52 This second approach takes a critical
view of the relations between law and society and seeks to
demonstrate how law helps construct society and it is not only society
that constructs law." Functionalist comparativists and those calling
to put law in context ignore the extent to which the social problems
that law "solves" are themselves "culturally constructed rather than
given." 4 As David Nelken observes:
We should not assume that societies being compared will
necessarily face the same 'problems' and use law in some
way to respond to them. We need to realise the extent to
47. Nelken, supra note 15, at 22; Orctic, Developing Comparative Law, supra note 12, at
51; see Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 749-50.
48. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 37, at 279-80; Nelken, supra note 15, at 19-20.
49. Nelken, supra note 15, at 25.
50. Id. at 24.
51. See infra Parts IV-V.
52. Nelken, supra note 15, at 21.
53. Id; see also Nora V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change
in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 647, 647 (1998) (discussing how law can
challenge society's status quo and bring about change).
54. See Nelken, supra note 15, at 22.
359
University of Baltimore Law Review
which cultures 'socially construct' what they treat as
problems, or the need to deal with them by using the law."
Gtinter Frankenberg is amongst the few comparative scholars
calling on comparativists to "recognise. .. law [as] a way of seeing"
and amongst the few to engage in a critical examination of finding
the context in law.56 He calls on comparativists to "discard the ...
law-in-the-books/law-in-action distinctions" and acknowledge how
we treat the "legal representations of local conflicts, contexts, and
visions."" Comparative law, particularly, Frankenberg argues,
operates both to construe social norms and values and to reflect
them."
Similarly, feminist legal scholars and other schools of critical legal
thought have long argued that law constructs society as much as
society constructs law." Thus, for example, feminist scholars have
demonstrated how differences that have been viewed as fixed and
natural, such as gender related differences, are in fact socially
construed and perpetuated in law.60 Moreover, it is the proclaimed
neutrality, objectivity, and universality of law that helps perpetuate
certain social structure and institutions that are oppressive to women
and other disempowered members of society and reify the dominance
of others in society. 6' As we shall see, feminist scholars argue that
law is a way of seeing which often serves as an oppressive force
against subordinated communities in that it elevates particular views
of the world and representation of events from the perspective of
those who possess the power to have their version of reality accepted
and treats them as objective and universal truth.62
D. The West v. The Rest
Acknowledging the dual role of comparative law to both construe
and reflect social norms and values can be a strength of comparative
law, positioning it to truly facilitate a "more nuanced understanding
55. Id at 22-23.
56. Id. at 23.
57. Giinter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology-Toward
a Layered Narrative, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 439, 442-43 (2006).
58. Demleitner, supra note 53, at 647.
59. See, e.g., id. ("Law reflects and constructs societal norms and values."); Christina G.
Ramirez, Book Note, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 57, 57-58 (1999) (reviewing NANCY
LEvrr, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW (1998)).
60. See infra Part III.
61. See infra Part V.
62. See infra Part V.
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of ourselves and others."63 At the same time, if we do not examine
our own implicit cultural value judgments, comparative law can be
misused and perpetuate entrenched social and legal power
structures." Nowhere has this tendency been more evident as in the
relations between the West and the Rest in comparative legal
studies. 5
Whether viewed as a separate discipline or more of a method to
expand our knowledge base, one stated goal of comparative law is to
facilitate better understating of, and to shed new light on, one's own
legal system.66 In their seminal 1968 work classifying legal systems,
Rend David and John Brierley stated that "[c]omparative law-and for
many this is its principal interest-constitutes an indispensable
instrument for a renewed study of our own legal science; it helps us
to know, understand and penetrate our own law."6 7  Armed with
comparative observations on the operations of law and culture in the
foreign legal system, the comparativist can ask, "Is there something
in the foreign culture that can benefit or lead to improvement of our
own system?""
And yet, such mutual learning has tended to be quite limited in
reach. More often than not, developed western countries have only
been willing to learn from other westernized developed systems (both
common law and civil law countries) which are viewed as similar
enough.69 Comparisons with developing legal systems or the global
south more often result in reinforcement of the advantages of one's
own familiar legal system.
In the developed western world, both those who see comparative
an , +b-. +Arrt A~ , a tool forlawv as an end in Itself" and thLose whovoct its& use as a l 
various practical purposes have tended to engage in one way
learning. On many occasions, the study of other legal systems results
in reinforcement of one's own familiar legal system. Even on those
occasions when the comparative knowledge points towards certain
disadvantages in one's own legal solution and to possible available
63. Demleitner, supra note 53, at 647.
64. Id.
65. Id at 653-54.
66. See, e.g., RENt DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 8 (The Free Press,
Collier-Macmillan 1968) (1964); Eberle, supra note 7, at 66.
67. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 66, at 8; see also Eberle, supra note 7, at 66 ("Just as
importantly, a look at foreign culture is just as likely to shed light on our own legal
culture. In effect, we are holding ourselves up to a mirror.").
68. Eberle, supra note 7, at 66.
69. See id. at 53-55.
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models in other places, the tendency is often to explain away the
suitability of such models based on social cultural differences or, in
exceptional cases, to import such transplants but only from other
similarly developed western legal regimes.70 This is most evident in
comparative inquiries pursued for specific practical purposes such as
harmonization efforts in the field of commercial law or rule of law
development projects.n In most cases, the learning focuses on
exporting western models to countries of the developing world rather
than in the opposite direction.72 It is not often that we see projects,
theoretical or otherwise, that set out to learn from the global south.
Even if it can be expected that practically oriented comparative
endeavors may be more one-directional in their primary outcome, at
least comparativists should be open to the idea of mutual learning,
open to be changed by the encounter, and open to connect and learn
from the "other." In the same way that the foreign place and the
other will never be fully accessible to the comparativist, Igor
Stramignoni argues that comparativists cannot escape being changed
by the comparative experience.7 3 While comparativists can never
fully leave their prior self behind on their "travels,"74 having traveled
they will no longer be the same as they used to be before.75 What is
needed is for comparativists to openly embrace the possibility of
being changed by the experience.
Why is it then that most contemporary comparative scholars and
practitioners continue to marginalize the impact of the comparative
encounter on both subject and object? A critical examination of
comparative law as political practice may help shed light. In doing
so, this article specifically problematizes how comparativists
approach similarities and differences. This article examines the
underlying dynamics of norming and othering and specifically the
concerns regarding essentialism and cultural relativism.7 6 At a more
fundamental level, this article suggests that comparative legal studies
need to explicitly address the relations between knowledge, power,
and ideology.
70. See Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets
Boundaries, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 737, 741-42 (1999).
71. See id. at 742-44.
72. See id.
73. See Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 766.
74. See infra Part IV.
75. See Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 766.
76. See infra Parts III-IV.
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III. DECONSTRUCTING SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Engaging in critical examination of finding the context in law and
exposing the ways in which comparative law (and law generally)
constructs social norms and values is particularly important with
regards to the question of similarities and differences which occupies
most comparativists and which has been said to be at the core of
comparative legal studies.n Such critical examination of similarities
and differences brings to the forefront the discourse of othering. By
definition, comparative law "deals with and analyzes the other, [i.e.]
the different."78 Feminist and critical race theories share with
comparative law a focus on the different, the other, and have
challenged the social and legal construction of sameness and
difference-the dichotomization of self and other." They therefore
assist comparative law in unpacking otherness and moving beyond
comparative law's obsession with differences and similarities.
The study of similarities and differences is at the heart of
comparative legal studies. Often, comparative work has focused on
finding similarities and differences in legally-oriented practices when
comparing societies that are otherwise perceived as similar.so It is
also valuable to find similarities in law in societies which are in other
respects perceived as very different."' While comparativists are quite
aware of the ever-present difficulties of knowing exactly what is
"similar" and what is "different," much of the discourse has focused
on whether we should focus on similar genealogical roots based, for
example, on the legal families taxonomy, focus on similarities in
culture, as with the cultural families taxonomy, or focus on other
political, economic, and developmental formants." Not much of the
discourse has focused on how we perceive similarities and
differences.
Comparative law's unstated normative methodology of us/here
against which them/there are measured and judged is ripe for feminist
critique, which has extensively engaged in deconstructing these
77. See Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism, supra note 70, at 740-41.
78. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law 's Potential for
Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 657 (1998).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See Cotterrell, supra note 25, at 134-35.
82. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 6-8, 10 (1997) (proposing to classify legal
systems based on the primary pattern of law amongst three competing patterns: rule of
professional law, rule of political law, and rule of traditional law).
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dichotomies, especially in the context of the legal relevance of gender
differences. The impetus of most comparativists has been to focus on
sameness.8 3 What has been missing from the discussion is the notion
that "identifying similarity is possible only in the context of non-
similarity or difference."" Comparison inherently involves
differentiation. But, FLT posit, we perceive otherness through our
contingent cultural lens." In comparing, we invariably rely on our
own unstated norms and values.86 Within comparative law, for
example, the geopolitical identity of the comparativists has served as
"the unstated norm against which the exotic other is viewed.""
Otherness, suggests FLT, is socially construed, contextual and
dynamic." FLT teaches us that how we perceive difference depends
on who is engaged in observing and their own perspective."
Women's experiences are living proof of this. Women experience
their lives both as victims of oppression and as agents resisting it-as
both subordinated by privacy and empowered by it-as both rational
and emotional. One lesson from feminist jurisprudence lies in the
rejection of simple dichotomies and the abandonment of the either/or
that characterize our current jurisprudence.90
Initially, much of the feminist discourse has focused on not only
identifying differences along gender lines as socially construed but
also on whether such differences should be celebrated nonetheless.9
83. Curran, supra note 78, at 666.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 667.
86. Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal
Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 525, 526 (1997); accord.
Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, A Comparative Analysis of Women's Issues: Towards a
Contextualized Methodology, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 347, 351 (1999) ("It is
important that a feminist who chooses to engage in comparative analysis learns to
suspend judgment in analyzing differences. Differences should be viewed in their
context and from a cultural perspective.").
87. Cossman, supra note 86, at 526. See generally Nathaniel Berman, Aftershocks:
Exoticization, Normalization, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion, 1997 UTAH L. REV.
281, 282 (1997) (explaining that comparativists combat inherent exoticization when
examining otherness).
88. Curran, supra note 78, 666-67.
89. Nelken, supra note 15, at 31.
90. See Cossman, supra note 86, at 543.
91. The strand of feminism referred to as cultural feminism "emphasized relationships,
the value of intimacy, the importance of mothering and caretaking, and other feminine
activities." Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 157, 162 (2010). They called for re-valuing of women's work,
women's contributions to our culture, and for acknowledging the different voice of
women. See id. at 158, 162, 165 (locating the three strands of "newer" feminist
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Much controversy amongst feminist legal scholars surrounded on
whether those differences associated with womanhood and
femininity, which, the argument goes, have been denigrated and
marginalized by the patriarchal hegemony to maintain the social
domination of men over women, should instead be celebrated,
normatively elevated, and used as a tool of empowerment. This line
of discourse resonates with calls for cultural plurality and for
recognition of the contributions that other cultures and traditions can
make to comparative law.
Rather than focus on the merit of valuing differences as much as
we value similarities, contemporary FLT have begun to deconstruct
the very terms on which the understanding of differences has been
based, for example, the juxtaposition of similarities and differences
as diametrically opposed to each other, as absolute opposites.9 2
Instead, they argue that we acknowledge that similarities and
differences are mutually constitutive; there is no self without
differentiation from the other." For example, Martha Minow views
differences as relational and "reveal[s] the unstated norms against
which difference has been judged."94
This feminist epistemology and methodology of deconstructing
difference and recognizing its relational nature can be applied within
comparative law as a way to begin to challenge its unstated norms
and displace its ethnocentrism." For the comparativist, therefore, the
goal should be:
scholarship-partial agency feminism, intersectional/anti-essentialist feminism, and
postmodern/poststructural feminisms-as a response to the older "Big Three" strands
of feminism - liberal, cultural, and dominance feminism).
92. Compare Curran, supra note 78, at 666 (arguing the merits of valuing differences as
much as similarities), with Cossman, supra note 86, at 543 (deconstructing the
juxtaposition of similarities and differences).
93. Cossman, supra note 86, at 543; cf Deseriee A. Kennedy, Transversal Feminism and
Transcendence, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 65, 89 (2005) (quoting
Filomina Chioma Steady, African Feminism: A Worldwide Perspective, in WOMEN IN
AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN DIASPORA (Rosalyn Terborg-Penn et al. eds., 1987)) ("For
women, the male is not 'the other' but part of the human same. Each gender
constitutes the critical half that makes the human whole. Neither sex is totally
complete in itself to constitute a unit by itself. Each has and needs complement,
despite the possession of unique features of its own.").
94. Cossman, supra note 86, at 527 n.2; see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 80 (1990); Martha Minow,
When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal
Protection and Legal Treatment of Diference, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 111, 112,
122 n.41, 175 n.212 (1987) [hereinafter When Diference Has Its Home].
95. Cossman, supra note 86, at 527 n.2.
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to establish one's own identity by seeing the others as not so
much like us, but rather us as very similar to them ...
[i]nstead of taking ourselves as the yardstick, as the norm,
we have to situate ourselves in the world in equivalent
distance from the 'others' whoever they might be.
The realization that similarities and differences are not mere
observable facts but are to a large extent socially construed, and even
more importantly, that the significance that we assign certain
similarities or differences is not only socially construed but is in fact
in the service of certain ideologies, is a critical lesson for comparative
legal studies. Particularly in an era of globalization, when
demonstrating similarity is often used to provide justification for
harmonization and convergence of legal regimes, or when those who
resist reform or relevant comparisons point out to unbridgeable
differences, it is critical that we further examine these similarities and
differences and question the political agenda behind them. First,
however, we need to further examine the essentialist and ethnocentric
stance from which most comparativists have construed similarities
and differences.
IV. AVOIDING THE TRAP OF BOTH ESSENTIALISM AND
RELATIVISM
Much of the critique and current angst of comparative law's
treatment of similarities and differences, of self and other, focuses on
the essentialist perspectives comparative law exhibits in both finding
similarities and differences and in devaluing and disempowering the
"different other." Comparative law and practice has been heavily
criticized as imperialistic, as taking the place of physical conquest
and colonization." Many have rightfully criticized comparative law
as western-centric and ethno-centric. Even those who call for
comparative law to focus more intently on non-western cultures and
on indigenous people," often take an essential view of the other
(benevolent as it may seem) and its culture."
96. Demleitner, supra note 53, at 652-53.
97. See, e.g., Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 262 ("[T]he current
rush toward codifications appears rather like a postmodern form of conquest executed
through legal transplants and harmonization strategies.").
98. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 7, at 54-55.
99. See, e.g., id. at 57 ("Law in action is quite important, even, to western culture. . . .
Law in action is even more critical for nonwestern cultures, as here the law may be
more a result of tradition, custom, or orality."). Id. at 57 (emphasis added). But
western law is as much the result of tradition and custom as in the nonwestern world.
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In contrast to the mainstream comparativist that is unaware of its
own perspectivity, its own subjectivity, the post-modern
comparativist may be too keenly aware of its inability to, on the one
hand, fully know the other, and, on the other hand, to fully escape the
biases of its self.' Such a comparativist agonizes over his or her
identity, over the authenticity of his or her comparative observations,
to the effect that any comparative insights offered are always couched
in language of relativism and contingent knowledge at best.
In his article Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in
Comparative Law, Giinter Frankenberg aptly juxtaposes these types
of comparative lawyers: the "mainstream hegemonic self' and the
"tragic self."' 0  The mainstream comparativist is typically
represented in "the three major schools of comparative thought"-
classical comparative law, focused on classifying legal systems;
better-solution/convergence comparativism; and comparative law and
economics. 0 2 All share universalist humanist aspirations and a belief
in ideal transcultural law and are untroubled by the empirical and
historical plurality of normative frameworks and cultures.10 3 For the
mainstreamers, the ability to compare and to know other systems'
legal norms is relatively uncomplicated and unproblematic, not
surprisingly so, as they share a strong bias about the superiority of
their home western Anglo/European law.'" At the same time, the
mainstreamer rejects critiques of ethnocentrism because for the
mainstreamer, law as he knows it is universal.0 s Hence, the
mainstreamer "does not even need to export or transplant" the
superior (hence universal) law of his home country, because
"wherever he goes and looks, it is always already there, if only in a
similar or dissimilar, derivative or rudimentary form."'o
Epistemologically, the mainstreamer uses objective discourse to try
and suppress his subjectivity and hide his paternalistic view-point.0 7
100. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 7, at 60 n. 17; Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra
note 10, at 266.
101. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 266.
102. Id. at 263.
103. Id. at 263-264.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 264.
106. Id. at 264-65.
107. Id at 263. A more detailed discussion of subjectivity versus objectivity and the
epistemology of knowledge will follow in the next section. See infra Part V.
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In contrast to the mainstreamer, the tragic comparativist is all too
well aware of cultural, moral, and epistemic differences.' He
recognizes the limitation and imperfections of his own legal system
as well as his intellectual situated-ness, and therefore agonizes over
not being able to genuinely know the other, let alone compare
different legal cultures.109 Acutely sensitive to ethnocentrism and
legal pluralism and to the need to contextualize knowledge and
values in light of power relations, history and culture, such
comparativist is left with no way to make actual critical judgments
and is tragically paralyzed.1 o Instead, the tragic comparativist
engages in metaphoric rhetoric, cautions against the problems of
comparability, and rejects all-encompassing explanations for fear of
ethnocentric imperialistic impositions disguised as supposedly
"value-free or objectively universal" standards."
How then is the comparativist to avoid the pitfalls of both the
mainstreamer and the tragic comparativist? How can the
comparativist negotiate both essentialism and relativism?
One approach, offered by Nathaniel Berman, calls on
comparativists to revisit the traditional epistemology, couched in
terms of merely trying to understand the other and often resorting to
simplistic understanding of "culture" and "legal culture."1 2 Instead,
he challenges comparativists to engage in critical comparative inquiry
by radically flipping familiar comparative techniques on their head:
"[I]n those contexts where the tradition would exoticize, normalize;
in those contexts where it would normalize, exoticize; in those
contexts where it finds infinite depths of meaning, formalize and
fragment.""' By resisting essentializing tradition and showing how
both our own and others' cultures are not homogenized but rather
"split, hybrid, and embedded in contexts of power" comparative law
can become transformative. 114
In imagining the Other, western comparativists often deal with
seemingly unbridgeable and unknowable differences by exoticizing
the Other, i.e. "view[ing] the Other as wholly different.""' In dealing
with such exotic differences, some have advocated respect, i.e.
108. Paolo G. Carozza, Continuity and Rapture in "New Approaches to Comparative
Law", 1997 UTAH L. REv. 657, 660 (1997).
109. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 266-67.
110. Id. at 266-69.
111. Id at 269.
112. Berman, supra note 87, at 281.
113. Id
114. Id
115. Id at 282.
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leaving the Other alone to its own (un-comprehensionable but non-
threatening) practices and culture.116 In contrast, too often have such
exotic differences been demonized as primitive and barbaric, to
justify conquest in the name of civilizing the Other."'
A parallel response on the other end of the spectrum has been to
"normalize" the Other, again both in "respectful" ways and in
"dismissive" ways." 8  Respectful normalization values the
contribution of the other cultures and traditions, and incorporates
them (though often in a marginal way) into mainstream social
structures and legal regimes."9 Dismissive normalization highlights
the similarity of such practices to "our" (normal) tradition, so that
they do not pose a challenge to mainstream concepts and can be
easily assimilated.'20
Lastly, those who are weary of too quickly categorizing the Other
as normal or as exotic, nonetheless view the Other as something that
needs to be studied and interpreted in depth. Driven by this
"hermeneutic compulsion," such scholars engage in an infinite
comprehensive study of the Other, necessitated, according to this
view, by the deep complexity of the Other.' 2 '
All three techniques essentialize the Other by treating its identity
and its culture as a unified coherent entity (either exotically different
from us or similarly normal), which we could only truly understand if
we continue to pursue a deeper and deeper level of interpretation. To
resist such essentialism, argues Berman, the comparativist should
engage in splitting, hybridization, and politicization of both the Self
and the Other.'22
Hence, the exoticizer should normalize by recognizing that the non-
western Other is as split (by gender, race, class, and religion) as the
comparativist's own society; by recognizing that the Other is not
"purely" other but rather a hybrid identity inflected by the West, as is
most often the case with legal systems of previously colonized
societies; and by recognizing that the colonizer's own society is
similarly inflected by that legacy, including the re-importation of
mutated colonial legal exports.'23 Recognizing that both the Self and
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 283.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 284-85.
122. Id at 284.
123. Id. at 282.
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the Other are similarly internally split and mutually constitutive of
each other's legal system thus forces the comparativist to abandon the
role of the outside observer and the pretense of "point-of-
viewlessness."l24 The comparativist is not neutral. "Any description
of the Other will always involve taking a position within the conflicts
that structure the Other's system."' 25 The comparativist must,
therefore, acknowledge the "political" in the "comparatative."l 26
Similarly, using splitting, hybridization, and politicization, the
normalizer should re-exoticize. But, rather than trying to re-establish
and differentiate previously normalized (and assimilated) cultures by
simply asserting their radical difference, we should at the same time
emphasize their internal splits, for example, along gender lines; their
inevitable hybridization over time, thus exposing claims for
authenticity as ideological; and the power structures within that
culture.127 These techniques will also allow the hermeneutic to
recognize that the infinite study of the Other may only lead to deeper
error; the split, hybrid, and politicized Other may simply resist a
totalizing meaning."'
Berman's approach demonstrates the important contribution
feminist theories and other critical schools of thought can make to
comparative law.129 Feminist epistemology, as well as substantive
commitment, is particularly well suited to tackle the comparativist's
existential angst head on. Feminism offers a critical epistemology
that challenges traditional modes of production of knowledge,
challenges a dichotomized discourse pitting similarities against
differences, the West versus the Rest, the normal versus the exotic,
and law versus culture.130
Feminism has itself faced criticism of ethnocentrism early on.
Women, and particularly women of color, whose diverse lived
experience did not resonate with the unstated white-upper class-
heterosexual norm of mainstream feminist theory and practice, have
exposed feminism's own partiality, its own essentialist perspective of
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See infra Part VI for an in depth discussion of theorizing comparative law as political
practice.
127. Berman, supra note 87, at 283-84.
128. Id at 285-86.
129. Carozza, supra note 108, at 657, 661-62.
130. See Elizabeth Anderson, Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edulentries/feminism-epistemology/ (last
modified Mar. 16, 2011).
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women and women's issues." ' Feminism has faced similar criticism
of its a-cultural stance as being inherently Western. 3 2 Third world
feminists criticize the international feminist movement "for [both]
excluding [and] essentializing the perspectives and needs of women
of color and third world women" in particular.133
Feminist scholars are increasingly aware of the dangers of either
extremes-the un-self-critical ethnocentric (akin to Frankenberg's
mainstream hegemonic-self) or the hyper-self-critical cultural
relativist (akin to Frankenberg's tragic self)-and have attempted to
pave new paths,'3 4 calling on us to view the world from more than a
single, reflexive position. Patricia Williams described this practice as
the "ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing that is . .. at the heart of
what is called critical theory, feminist theory, and the so-called
minority critique."' It is the "fluid positioning that sees back and
forth across boundary,"l36 and which has been the "daily experience
of people of color and of women." 37
Mari Matsuda, for example, suggests that we can avoid
essentialism by adopting "multiple consciousness" and employing
strategies of "consciousness-shifting" to pursue justice.' In
consciousness-shifting, Matsuda refers to the ability to see that the
law reflects a particular viewpoint, the ability to operate within that
view, and at the same time the ability to critically extract one-self out
131. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803,
843-45 (1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 155-57 (analyzing the ways in which
feminist theory and anti-discrimination principles obscured the "multidimensionality
of Black women's lives" and introducing the concept of intersectionality); Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585
(1990) (criticizing feminist theories for obscuring the voice of black women by failing
to recognize the differences in experiences and reality for black women and for
essentializing gender over race and class). For example, minority and poor women
who have faced the challenges of working outside the home or have had the state
intervene in their reproductive and child-rearing preferences experience their lives
very differently from middle-class white women. See Cain, supra at 844-45.
132. Cossman, supra note 86, at 526-27.
133. L6pez, supra note 86, at 348-49.
134. See Cossman, supra note 86, at 525, 527.
135. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2151 (1989).
136. Id.
137. Pat Williams, Response to Mari Matsuda, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 11, 11 (1989).
138. See Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989).
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of that view.1' The key point is not to simply see multiple points of
view, but to make a genuine effort to see excluded and oppressed
viewpoints and know the concrete lived details of others.1 40
A similar approach offered by Deseriee Kennedy conceptualizes
"transversal feminism" as a way to create diverse and inclusive
feminist theory. "By emphasizing the importance and relevance of
individual experience and perspectives, it reinforces the importance
of anti-essentialism and intersectionality in developing effective
feminist legal theory."l 4 ' Building on the work of Nira Yuval Davis
on transversal politics,142 Kennedy offers a methodology of "rooting"
and "shifting."l 43  Rooting means that participants in a dialogue
(political, cultural, or legal, for that matter) understand their own
position in the world, and hence the unique (and incomplete)
positionality of their perspective.'" At the same time, they also try to
shift by listening and putting themselves in the situation of others in
the dialogue who are positioned differently.145 Such shifting requires
empathy.146  It may not be easy to understand those whose
experiences and values are very different from our own, but we can
make a good faith effort to learn to identify with others and to allow
ourselves to be moved by others.'47
Of course, claiming to put ourselves in the exact shoes of the other,
risks becoming as essentialist and unattainable as the current
139. Id.
140. Id
141. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 92.
142. Id at 75-78 (citing the works of Nira Yuval-Davis including: Nira Yuval-Davis,
Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics, in GLOBAL FEMINISM:
TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN'S ACTIVISM, ORGANIZING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 275, 280-83,
290 (Myra Marx Ferree & Aili Mari Tripp eds., 2006); NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, GENDER
AND NATION 88, 130 (1997); Nira Yuval-Davis, The Cairo Conference, Women and
Transversal Politics, 6 Women Against Nation 88, 130 (1997); Nira Yuval-Davis, The
Cairo Conference, Women and Transversal Politics, 6 WOMEN AGAINST
FUNDAMENTALISM 19, 21 (1995)).
143. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 76.
144. Id. (quoting Yuval-Davis, Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics,
supra note 142, at 275, 282).
145. Id. (quoting Yuval-Davis, Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics,
supra note 142, at 275, 282).
146. Id. (citing Yuval-Davis, Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics,
supra note 142, at 275, 283).
147. See Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 769, 815 (1994) (quoting Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, 1 THE
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 36, 36 (1991)).
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(objective) standards.'48 At the same time, by trying to take the
perspective of another, we acknowledge the partiality of our own
perspective. 149 This forces us to question our own categories and
assumptions and expose other power webs that may have not affected
us as much as they have others.'s At the very least, the impossibility
of fully knowing the perspective of another invites a certain amount
of humility and self-doubt when we try to gain knowledge.
Acquiring this knowledge may, in turn, allow us to "glimpse" a point
of view other than our own, or at least acknowledge that our own
point of view is not the only truth and to open our minds to accept
more than one, two, or even three truths in any given situation."'
Brenda Cossman's article, Turning the Gaze Back on Itselj'
Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial
Project,'52 provides a direct example of the immense potential of
feminist theories to comparative law. Cultural relativism arguments
accept that we cannot escape comparative law's inherent
ethnocentrism, and therefore suggest that we abandon the
comparative project altogether.1' Cossman, on the other hand,
argues that feminist insights can mitigate the essentialism-relativism
debate within comparative law and offer a way out of the
148. As Mari Matsuda points out: "I cannot pretend that I, as a Japanese American, truly
know the pain of, say, my Native American sister. But I can pledge to educate myself
so that I do not receive her pain in ignorance." Matsuda, supra note 138, at 10.
149. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Forward. Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REv. 10, 60 (1987) [hereinafter Justice Engendered].
150. Martha Minow explains:
[I]f you try to break out of unstated assumptions and take the
perspective of [the "other"] . . . You may see an injury that you
had not noticed, or take more seriously a harm that you had
otherwise discounted . . . [Y]ou will then get the chance to
examine the reference point you usually take for granted. Maybe
you will conclude that the reference point itself should change ...
You may find you had so much ignored the point of view of
others that you did not realize that you were mistaking your point
of view for reality. Perhaps you will find that the way things are
is not the only way things could be ...
Id. at 72.
151. See When Diference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 129-30.
152. Cossman, supra note 86.
153. Id. at 526.
373
University of Baltimore Law Review
ethnocentric gaze by strategically turning the (ethnocentric) "gaze
back on itself."1 54
Cossman builds on her collaborative study with Ratna Kapur on
law and feminism in India,' 5 examining, amongst other things, how
the legal regulation of women in India is informed by and perpetuates
"familial ideology."'56 The concept of familial ideology, however, is
not as naturalized and universalized at it may first seem.'57 "Familial
ideology looks very different in the Indian context than in the Anglo-
American context."' By interrogating, refraining, and recasting this
concept we begin to transform the concept itself and open the door to
turning the gaze of comparison back on ourselves.'5 9 We can begin
to displace the hegemonic discourse of the West by insisting on
multidirectional flow of the comparative analysis." Thus, for
example, instead of asking "what is culturally specific about familial
ideology in India" (which retains the West as the unstated norm), we
should turn our gaze and ask "what is culturally specific about
familial ideology in Anglo-American legal system[]," (allowing the
non-Anglo-American context to become a stated norm).' 6 '
Consequently, what is being compared starts to shift, and unstated
monolithic norms are replaced with multiple stated norms.162 This
"in-between space" that "recognize[s] and nurture[s] cultural
hybridity" may eventually allow us to differently inhabit our world
and transform our gaze.'63
To be clear, in turning the gaze back on ourselves we do not escape
its specificity. By explicitly stating our previously unstated norms as
well as opening the door to embrace other norms we still face the
challenges entailed in having to choose between possibly
154. Id. at 527.
155. Id. at 527 (referencing RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES:
FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA (1996)).
156. Cossman, supra note 86, at 531-32.
157. See id. at 531.
158. Id. at 536. In the Anglo-American context, as well as other industrialized, capitalist
societies, the nuclear, heterosexual, patriarchal family-with entrenched roles for
women as wives, mothers, and economic dependents-is the dominant household
arrangement. Id. at 531-32. In India, on the other hand, the joint family is believed to
be the dominant household structure. Id. at 534. The joint family concept itself was
historically mainstreamed in by the British colonizers in India, and therefore itself
represents the cultural hybridity of India rather than a "pure" authentic Indian culture.
Id. at 534-35.
159. Id. at 536.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 536-37.
163. Id. at 537.
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incompatible normative regimes, social arrangements, and legal
frameworks. We will still have to make normative hard choices. To
do that, I argue, we will need to turn our gaze to comparative law as a
political practice."
In sum, the broader strategic deployment of proposals such as
Berman's and Cossman's within comparative law, and a way out of
the essentialism-relativism quandary, lies not only in acknowledging
our "subjectivity" and unsuccessfully (and impossibly) trying to
escape it, but in deconstructing the subjective-objective dichotomy all
together.16 5  It requires us, therefore, to deconstruct our own
"hegemonic grid" about the production of knowledge. 6 6
V. COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, THE PRODUCTION OF
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: A CRITIQUE OF
OBJECTIVITY
"To compare things," observes Paolo G. Carozza, "we must be able
to know what they are." 67  Hence, we approach the problem of
comparability differently depending on our approach to how we
know and whether we can even know.
As we have seen, a key critique leveled against mainstream
comparativists has to do with the stance of universal objectivity they
advance in their comparisons. Typically, for a mainstream
comparativist, the (western) home law is the natural (superior)
standard.168  Measured against this yardstick, similarities and
dissimilarities "observed" through the comparative study mirror
concepts in the comparativist's home legal system-the only relevant
system.1
Unlike classical comparativists, who have been criticized for their
cultural blinders, most contemporary comparativists caution against
ignoring our own cultural biases when proceeding with the
comparative endeavor. However, many proceed on the assumption
that, once acknowledged, we can free ourselves from our subjective
164. See infra Part VI.
165. Cf Cossman, supra note 86, at 539 ("Not only does it require that the Anglo-
American feminist legal scholar recognize the partiality of her perspective, but it also
directs her attention to the way in which that partial perspective shapes how the
comparative knowledge is received and interpreted.").
166. Carozza, supra note 108, at 661; Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10,
at 270.
167. Carozza, supra note 108, at 660.
168. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 265-66.
169. Id.
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cultural biases, immerse ourselves in the foreign culture and study it
with an open heart, and eventually step back outside of that culture
and objectively assess the data obtained. 170 Feminist insights, in turn,
question the ability to divorce ourselves from our so-called
subjectivity and, more fundamentally, question the subjectivity-
objectivity divide and the notion of an attainable universal, neutral
and objective knowledge.' 7'
Comparativists, like travelers, try to learn new things about the
people and places they investigate and consequently to "shorten[] the
distance" between the comparativists and the subject of
investigation.'72 However, asks Igor Stramignoni, "[C]an travelers
ever hope to meet whatever lies ahead of them on its own terms? Or
do travelers risk, instead, remaining forever foreign-both distant
from their own past and never quite close enough to whatever else
lies ahead?"'7  In reality, traveling is as much about encountering
one's own past, as it is about discovering one's own foreignness. 74
Comparative law is as much, if not more so, about learning the self
anew as it is about learning the other. The risk is, of course, that our
gaze of the unfamiliar other may "find" exactly that which we set out
to find. Rather than ask whether comparativists can ever fully
understand unfamiliar laws, institutions, or cultures, we need to ask
whether comparativists can ever access the otherness of their own
familiar past. "Can they ever go past certain differences that, upon
closer inspection, might turn out to be not much more than a
celebration of sameness?" 75
Instead of proceeding with the assumption that law or culture are
constant realities that can be classified systematically,'7 6 we should
recognize our own learning experience where old knowledge and
new knowledge, knowledge of the self and knowledge of the other,
interact and mutually construct each other.77 More importantly, such
170. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in
US. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 43, 44 (1998); Eberle, supra note 7, at 52-
53.
171. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural
Defense", 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 78-80 (1994) (noting feminist scholars'
discussions of how subjectivity and objectivity are opposed within the law and
whether a universal rule of law exists).
172. Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 740.
173. Id at 741 (emphasis omitted).
174. Id at 742.
175. Id at 743.
176. Ginter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J.411, 415-16 (1985).
177. Id at 416.
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a learning process challenges any claims for universal truths and
complete and objective knowledge. 178
Objectivity is a fundamental precept of Anglo-American
jurisprudence.179 Patricia Williams observes how the opposition of
objectivity to subjectivity constructs our theoretical legal
understanding.' Our legal thought and rhetoric are characterized by
the existence of "transcendent, acontextual, universal legal truths"
that are conveyed through objective discourse."s'8 "The more serious
side of this essentialized world view is a worrisome tendency to
disparage anything that is nontranscendent (temporal, historical), or
contextual (socially constructed), or non-universal (specific) as
'emotional,' 'literary,' 'personal,' or just '[n]ot [t]rue."'1"82 The result
is, as Letti Volpp points out, that our jurisprudence "fails to recognize
the inherent subjectivity of legal standards and masks the oppressive
force of the law against subordinated communities."'
Williams and Volpp are not alone in pointing out the subjectivity of
objectivity. As part of a persistent feminist investigation of the
relationship between power and knowledge, many feminist scholars
have demonstrated how particular views of the world dominate our
discourse and production of knowledge.' 84 These critiques question
claims of "objectivity" and "neutrality" or statements with
"universal" applicability.' The point is that "frequently what passes
for the whole truth is instead a representation of events from the
perspective of those who possess the power to have their version of
reality accepted."'
Martha Minow, for example, problematizes knowledge because it
embodies certain social and political positions.8 7  She joins other
feminists in arguing 'that the unspoken assumption of objectivity
masks the fact that knowledge is construed from the vintage point of
the observer.' Reality is constructed from the unstated and biased
178. Id. at 413.
179. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 8-9 (1991).
180. Id. at 8-9, 11.
181. Id at 8-9.
182. Id. at 9.
183. Volpp, supra note 171, at 80.
184. Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in
Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. OF WOMEN & L. 95, 95 (1992).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 174.
188. Id. at 175.
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standpoint of the observer,' for we cannot see the world unclouded
by preconceptions. As Minow writes: "Inevitably seeing entails a
form of subjectivity, an act of imagination, a way of looking that is
necessarily in part determined by some private perspective. Its
results are never simple 'facts,' amenable to 'objective' judgments,
but facts or pictures that are dependent on the internal visions that
generate them."l 90
This argument is not uniquely feminist. Feminists, however, have
also exposed how our discourse of neutrality hides the lack of
objectivity as well as the oppressive impact of the hegemonic view.'
The observer's perspective is also oppressive because knowledge is
inextricably intertwined with social power.'92 Thus, social
understandings based on "prevailing views" or "consensus
approaches" express the perspectives of those socially positioned to
enforce their points of view in society.'
The focus on the relation between knowledge and power allows
Minow to question the categorizing of people based on purportedly
objective and inevitable differences. She argues that the claim to
knowledge manifested by the "labeling of any group as different ...
disguises the act of power by which the namers simultaneously assign
names and deny their relationships with, and power over, the
named."l94 Instead of being objective, any perspective presented as
"the truth" excludes competing perspectives by the sheer power of its
holder.' Because power relations are imbalanced and often
oppressive, the namers can simply ignore less powerful
perspectives.'96 Hence, "[t]he assignment of difference then marks
the relationship between those who have the power to claim that
theirs is the true perspective and those who have no such power.""
In sum, what initially seems an objective stance may appear partial
from another point of view. Moreover, what initially seems as an
objective difference may in fact be an act of exclusion and
subordination."' In any event, the possibility of multiple
189. Id. at 176.
190. Justice Engendered, supra note 149, at 45 (quoting EVELYN Fox KELLER, A FEELING
FOR THE ORGANISM 150 (1983)).
191. Id at 45-46.
192. When Diference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 128.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Justice Engendered, supra note 149, at 33.
196. When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 128.
197. Id at 175.
198. Justice Engendered, supra note 149, at 14.
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perspectives undermines the notion of objectivity and "shows how
claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims."l 99
Catharine MacKinnon also uses seemingly natural and real
differences-the differences between men and women based on
sex-to question objectivity." According to MacKinnon, objectivity
assumes we all see the same thing,20 ' that only one reality exists, and
that this reality is not contingent on the observer's positioning.2 02 But
if sex-discriminatory conditions exist for women, there are (at least)
two realms of social meaning.20 3 Consequently, if women inhabit a
sex-discriminatory reality, their point of view is no more subjective
than men's."2 The point of this observation is that "social
circumstances, to which gender is central, produce distinctive
interests, hence perceptions, hence meanings, hence definitions of
rationality."2 05  It follows, for example, that neutral so-called
objective legal standards are inadequate to describe "the nonneutral
objectified social reality that women experience."20 6
The core issue, however, is not the plain inadequacy of the stance
of objectivity to address socially constructed realities, but the
oppressive domination of male power that is objective epistemology.
MacKinnon writes: "[T]he male standpoint dominates civil society in
the form of the objective standard-that standpoint which, because it
dominates in the world, does not appear to function as a standpoint at
all."207
Objectivity as epistemology defines both the process of
observation or acquiring knowledge and the content of that
knowledge and the world observed. 208 As the traditionally superior
methodology for acquiring knowledge, we have seen that the
epistemology of objectivity erects distance and a-perspectivity as its
199. Id.
200. CATHARINE A. MACKINNoN, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 229-30
(1989) [hereinafter FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE]. The implications of
MacKinnon's insights are not limited to the inadequacy of gender-blind standards in
addressing sex inequality. Moreover, although MacKinnon focuses on the role of
gender in forming perceptions and women's reality, her observations are applicable to
race and class as well.
201. Id. at 231.
202. Id. at 232.
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 237.
208. Id. at 97.
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methodological criteria.2 While the criteria of distance and a-
perspectivity appear to be general ways of getting at reality, rather
than constructing it, they are in fact socially determined and devalue
"perspective[s] from the bottom of the social order."210
Moreover, the objectivist epistemology controls the content of and
what will be viewed as knowledge.2 1 ' Objectivity "defines the
relevant world as that which can be objectively known." 2 12  It
assumes the existence of an objective "knowable" reality which is not
dependent on how or who gains that knowledge.213
In light of our current gendered social hierarchies, the world which
can be objectively known corresponds with men's reality.214 Since
men control the world, they "create the world from their own point of
view, which then becomes the [reality] to be described." 2 15 The male
epistemological stance, objectivity, does not comprehend its own
perspectivity or that it presupposes the way things are.2 16 "What is
objectively known corresponds to the world [as men live it, and can
thus] be verified by being pointed to . .. because the world itself is
controlled from the same male point of view." 217
After exposing objectivity for its maleness, feminists exposed the
divide between objectivity and subjectivity, as well as other
dichotomies, as a product of male power. On the one hand, women
have been sexually objectified; on the other hand, they have been
devalued as creatures of emotion and subjectivity. Consequently,
feminists reject the objective-subjective distinction.2 18 The goal is not
to affirm feminine particularity and reject masculine universality, nor
to reclaim female passion in place of male rationality.219 We should
reject the division between objectivity and subjectivity, between
reason and emotion, and between abstract and concrete, as well as the
209. "To perceive reality accurately, one must be distant from what one is looking at and
view it from no place and at no time in particular, hence from all places and times at
once." Id.
210. Id. at 99.
211. Id. at 97.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 121-22.
215. Id. at 121.
216. Id. at 121-22.
217. Id.
218. "Disaffected from objectivity, having been its prey, but excluded from its world
through relegation to subjective inwardness, women's interest lies in overthrowing the
distinction itself," argues MacKinnon. Id. at 120-21.
219. See id.
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discourse of opposites itself, because they are invented from a
position of power to maintain gender hierarchy.220
We came to view the world in dualisms. 22 1  These binary pairs
came to be viewed as natural and neutral; they are mere tools
describing a pre-existing reality rather than having been constructed
by men to serve men's interests.222 Feminists exposed these
dichotomies as ideological social constructs driven by male power
that are far from being natural or inevitable.223 For example, if what
we consider universal is in fact a particular perspective of dominant
male power, then the distinction between universal and particular
collapses. 224  The subjective/objective dichotomy is similarly false,
because the so-called objective truth embodies a specific subjective
view from the social position of dominance that is occupied by
men. 225  Therefore, as long as men continue to control women and
male preferences continue to shape our world and discourse, such
dichotomies will continue to look "general, empty of content,
universally available to all, valid, mere tools, against which all else
fell short." 2 26
Accordingly, law will continue to value objectivity and neutrality,
and to marginalize particular perspectives as subjective and culturally
biased. Similarly, comparativists continue to maintain the fiction
220. We came to view the world generally as "a series of complex dualisms," such as
reason and passion, rational and irrational, power and sensitivity, thought and feeling,
and objective and subjective. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1575 (1983) [hereinafter The
Family and the Market] .
Men, who . . . created our dominant consciousness [and
discourse], have organized these dualisms into a system in which
each dualism has a strong . . . positive side and a weak . . .
negative side. Men associate themselves with the strong sides of
the dualisms and project the weak sides upon women.
Id. "Socially, men are considered objective, women subjective." FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 200, at 97. Privileging reason over emotion or objectivity
over subjectivity is traditionally male. The binary pairs, in turn, reflect the hierarchy
of gender in our society-the privileged status and control of men over women. See
The Family and the Market, supra, at 1575-76.
221. The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1575.
222. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
687, 690 (2000).
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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that, in general, comparative facts can be objectively described from
a neutral stance, rather than acknowledging that our experiences and
identities always shape the way we perceive the world. This stance
of objectivity serves to legitimize the status quo and to perpetuate the
dominance of particular views from a position of power as the true
representation of reality, while other constructions of reality are
dismissed as untrue and undeserving of legal and social recognition.
Comparativists must rethink how we come to know what we know.
Each of us is a "prisoner of his own experiences." 227 Since we cannot
eliminate our prejudices, we can at least recognize them.228 Similar
to feminist legal scholars, Gtinter Frankenberg calls on
comparativists to make a conscious effort to establish subjectivity.229
Comparative work can benefit greatly from a critical attitude towards
alleged universal categories and claims to authenticity.230  We can
nonetheless engage in meaningful comparisons by distancing
ourselves, as long as we question the neutrality of the comparison,
factor in the impact of our perspective and experience, and
understand how subjective our comparisons can be. 231' This, argues
Frankenberg, is "critical comparison." 23 2
The question then becomes, is it possible for feminist or other
outsider constructions of reality to attain the status of objectivity
within a legal framework that recognizes multiple realities? Rather
than trying to attain the status of objectivity within a discourse based
on the division of objectivity from subjectivity, I argue that we can
strive to discard the male epistemology of objectivity and the
dichotomies it entails and adopt a concrete, experience-based, multi-
perspectival epistemology and methodology. 233 But the point is not
that subjectivity is superior to objectivity. This alternative
epistemology is not to be mistaken for replacing male objectivity
with female subjectivity.
We need to abandon the pretense of abstract objectivity and
universal knowledge and adopt a multi-perspectival way of knowing
227. Paul P. Dumont, Comment, Radke v. Everett: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme
Court's Rejection of the Reasonable Woman/Victim Standard: Treating Perspectives
That Are Different As Though They Were Exactly Alike, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
255, 255 (1997) (citing Edward R. Murrow, News Commentary, Dec. 31, 1955).
228. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons, supra note 176, at 413.
229. Id. at 414.
230. Id. at 443.
231. Id at 414.
232. See id 413-16.
233. Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373,
1402 (1986).
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informed by the detailed particularities of our lives. These
particularities then "become facets of the collective understanding
within which differences constitute rather than undermine
collectivity."23 4 As Ann Scales observes, if the purpose of law is
indeed to decide the moral crux of the matter in real human
situations, "[i]t would seem obvious that law's duty is to enhance,
rather than to ignore, the rich diversity of life. Yet this purpose is not
obvious; it is obscured by the myth of objectivity which opens up
law's destructive potential."2 35
The myth of objectivity exemplifies the way in which knowledge-
itself an embodiment of power-has been used as a mechanism of
exclusion and marginalization of those who do not possess the power
to have their version of reality accepted. The abstract universality of
the objective point of viewlessness in comparative law, and in law in
general, treats the particular perspectives of the powerful as reality
and defines other perspectives out of existence.236 In contrast, aware
of the inextricable connection between knowledge and power,
feminists practice a positive, inclusive, and empowering vision of
knowledge.237
Feminist epistemology values the multiplicity of perspectives and
realities. It takes multiplicity to be constitutive of reality; it sees the
relational web between dominant and subordinated perspectives; and
it views different perspectives as always in flux.2 38 Feminist legal
scholars have developed several versions of such multi-perspectival
jurisprudence, but one message, captured by Martha Minow, unites
them: "Only through the variety of relationships constructed by many
people seeing from different perspectives can truth be known and
community be created."239
Transcending our own perspective is not an impossible challenge.
We can try and minimize the impact of the situated self by
approaching our inquiry from an honest critical stance.240 For one,
we should recognize that our usage of language as a means of
observation and differentiation is itself rooted in our culture and
234. FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 200, at 86.
235. Scales, supra note 233, at 1387-88.
236. See id. at 1380.
237. Id. at 1388.
238. Id.
239. Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE
LAW 24, 34 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
240. Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 758.
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history.241 Nonetheless, even if we are successful in deconstructing
and transcending the hegemonic grid of self/other, of
subjectivity/objectivity, and expose knowledge as a mask for the
hegemonic exercise of power, how would we be able to make any
normative hard judgments? What norm should guide us?2 42
Here as well, FLT can provide useful insights to comparative legal
studies. First, rather than merely deconstructing the hegemonic
discourse, FLT offers a prescriptive vision, calling on us to explicitly
examine our underlying substantive commitments.243 Instead of
agonizing over identity, Frances Olsen calls on the comparativist to
start examining his or her politics. 2" Second, we should view our
commitment to voice multiplicity and diversity as part of an
expanded commitment to the true sharing of social power. Multi-
perspectivity is both an epistemology and a substantive commitment.
It requires a dedication to making decisions based on genuine
attempts at understanding the perspectives and social circumstances
of others, to making choices with care and humility.24 5 Moreover, it
requires a willingness to reach results that actually produce the
sharing of power with the powerless.2 46 Comparative law, I would
argue, is particularly suited to serve as a subversive practice on a
global scale, marrying substance and method to re-envision national,
international and transnational legal regimes.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGING COMPARATIVE LAW AS POLITICAL
PRACTICE
"Who would have thought that comparative law might become an
invasive political enterprise with considerable practical impact ...
[a]n ally of power ... .?"247
Comparative law and legal studies present themselves as divorced
from politics, "without either a political agenda or a geopolitical
location." 248 Even Frankenberg, who is a vocal critic of traditional
comparative law, suggests that the politicization of comparative law
is a more recent phenomena, which is tied to efforts by postcolonial
241. Id.
242. Carozza, supra note 108, at 662.
243. See Scales, supra note 233, at 1387-88.
244. Frances Olsen, The Drama of Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv 275, 279 (1997).
245. Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lesson of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and
Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 1, 10-12 (1993).
246. See id. at 35.
247. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 260 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
248. Cossman, supra note 86, at 542.
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colonizers, both national and supra-national forces, to transplant
various aspects of their legal systems and rule of law in transitional
economies seeking to participate in global markets.2 49
Comparative law, however, has always had an implicit political
feature to it both abroad250 and at home.25 1 Comparativists old and
new have just "carried the card of political affiliations" quietly.252 As
David Kennedy points out, however, the lack of discussion amongst
comparativists about comparative law as a political practice can itself
be seen as a political position.25 3  As discussed earlier, the questions
of law and context, of similarities and differences, of west and the
rest, all support viewing comparative law as a political practice.254
Frances Olsen agrees with Frankenberg's main critique:
"Comparative law has become an invasive political enterprise and it
is important for those engaged in it to be self-critical. Comparativists
should recognize the power relations involved." 255  It is the self-
249. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 260.
250. See Carozza, supra note 108, at 659 (citing Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin
American Law (Part I), 1997 UTAH L. REV. 425 (1997), who shows how Rene
David's classification of Latin American law in one way over another served to
expand the liberal democratic European tradition).
251. Comparative law has often been used to effectively reinforce or challenge the social
and political discourse in one's home legal system. Amalia Kessler, for example,
argues that American lawyers and scholars contrast European legal traditions and
"commitment to inquisitorial modes" of justice and to bureaucratic judicial structure
"in order to highlight the supposedly distinctive . . . virtues" of the American legal
system as committed to the protection of the individual from the state and to values of
equity and justice. In this way, she argues, American comparativists have both
shielded their institutions from any threat of reform as well as elevated the status of
the legal profession. See Amalia D. Kessler, The Making and Debunking of Legal
Tradition, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011).
252. Carozza, supra note 108, at 659.
253. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 1997 UTAH. L. REV. 545, 626 (1999).
254. See Carozza, supra note 108, at 659 (citing Esquirol, supra note 250, at 425);
Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 626.
255. Olsen, The Drama of Comparative Law, supra note 244, at 278. Olsen argues,
however, that there is a limit to how much of their own political agenda
comparativists serving as law reform consultants can in fact achieve. Id. at 279.
Comparativists may be able to utilize the comparative work to influence political
development in their own countries, to challenge underlying assumptions and the
status quo in their own legal system; they will not likely be able to successfully push
such agenda in the foreign place in which they are serving as experts. Id. It will take
the people of that country to carry out social change. Id. So indeed, the comparativist
has to know his or her political agenda in performing the comparative work, but also
in order to serve some domestic agenda. Id. at 280. The hope is, suggests Olsen, that
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conscious and explicit discourse of the politics of comparative law
and of comparative law (and any law) as political practice, as an
ideology of power, that marks the most important and promising
contribution FLT can make to comparative legal studies.256
Critical feminist legal theories posit that the personal is political,
that law's objectivity and universality is political.25 7 As Brenda
Cossman observes, "[w]e make no claims to neutrality in our work,
but rather begin from an explicitly and unapologetically political
location." 25 8 So what are the political locations of comparative law?
In his article on Comparativism and International Governance,
David Kennedy explores the roles comparativists play in international
governance. 259 Kennedy argues for situating comparative law within
the broader problems of international governance, where it plays
several important roles.26 0 Far from being disinterested outside
observers, we should see comparativists for what they are: "people
with ... political, professional, and personal projects of ... [global]
governance."2 61
Comparative law sees itself as specifically not about politics or
governance projects.262 As such, for the comparativist, colonization
and imperialism, global trade, or the migration of ideas and legal
concepts are not projects at all, but merely facts and history serving
as backdrop to his comparative understanding.263 The comparativist
does not seek power or aspires to rule but rather seeks to further
intellectual understanding.2 6
Take, for example, comparative law's traditional focus on private
law. The most central comparative law stories told by leading
comparativists, such as the difference between common law and civil
law or the reception of Roman law, are perceived as private law
stories, a matter of non-governmental ordering.26 5 They most often
attribute the migration of particular legal rules to incidental
borrowing and transplantation, to ad-hoc advancement of
"including formerly exotic countries in the western regime of law might somehow
undermine the hegemonic status of the West." Id.
256. Carozza, supra note 108, at 662 ("There is no question that it can give us new ways to
revisit the basic questions of comparative law and can generate important insights.").
257. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
258. Cossman, supra note 86, at 542.
259. Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 551.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 554.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 556.
265. Id. at 583-84.
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autonomous legal expertise, or to the natural extension of broad legal
land cultural families, rather than to a strategic political choice or
struggle.26 In sum, private comparative law distances itself from
governance.26 7
In contrast, Kennedy advocates seeing comparative law's concern
with a-political intercultural and cross-legal understanding as
comparative law's strategic (and hidden) project of governance.2 68
To further develop his argument, Kennedy draws on post-colonial
feminist critique of parallel dynamics of governance within the field
of international law-the insight that international law's overt
disengagement with culture (rather than viewing international law as
one cultural form amongst many) is itself a form of governance.2 69
In order to uncover comparative law's connections to governance,
Kennedy offers a rough typology of three broad geographic sub-
divisions 270 and two broad methodological styles271 within
comparative law. He demonstrates their different strategies of
disengaging from governance, by either presenting their involvement
as merely that of an outside independent expert facilitating someone
else's project, or as purely an intellectual matter of developing
knowledge (granted, often focused on reinforcing the uniqueness of
western legal tradition, arguing about what is required to sustain the
266. Id. at 583.
267. Comparativists dealing with public law similarly distance themselves from
governance. While private law comparativists maintain the fiction that private law
has nothing to do with politics, public law comparativists are forced to recognize the
politicization of public law, but proclaim to leave it to the politicians and the
governing institutions.
268. Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 580-81.
269. Id at 578-80.
270. Those focused on western traditions, i.e. first world countries; those focused on non-
western exotic legal systems; and those focused on universal frameworks. Id. at 593-
94.
271. The "technocrats" are concerned with concrete harmonization/modernization projects,
which require their comparative expertise, and the "culture vultures" view themselves
as intellectuals and stress history and cultural specificity. Id. at 594. Consequently,
the western tradition first world technocrat engages with harmonization projects,
while the first world culture vulture tackles a variety of classic comparative law
subjects. Id. Within the non-western exotic context, the technocrat focuses on
development and rule of law projects, while the culture vulture pursues areas studies.
Id. Lastly, the technocrat's project at the universal arena typically advances
international economic law, while the universalist culture vulture focuses on legal
families and universal private law. Id.
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west against the rest, or observing what is universally human) and not
a matter of politics or power.27 2
Next, Kennedy unveils three key ways in which, he argues,
comparativists participate in international governance.27 3 All three
demonstrate the broader argument, that not only are comparative
law's methods and subjects of inquiry far from being fixed and
objective, but that they directly serve to construe and perpetuate
particular exclusionary normative frameworks and power relations on
a global scale.274
First, the comparative practice of "finding similarities" and
differences, of exoticizing and normalizing, is itself a normative
political practice.275 Comparativists facilitate the legitimacy of
international law regimes, such as universal human rights, by
negotiating the tension with cultural differences (either reassuring
that some cultural differences nonetheless share familiar
commonalities and can be accommodated or assimilated, or that they
are so exotic that they should just be left outside the reach of
international law).276
Second, as we have seen, comparativists participate in the broader
social project of constructing and perpetuating law in general as a-
political, non-ideological, and separate from power structures within
society.277 For example, study of foreign legal systems is often used
to legitimize the domestic operations of law and to reinforce the
social and political discourse in one's home legal system. 278 Amalia
Kessler argues that American lawyers and scholars contrast European
legal traditions and commitment to inquisitorial modes of justice and
to bureaucratic judicial structure in order to highlight the supposedly
distinctive virtues of the American legal system as committed to the
protection of the individual from the state and to values of equity and
justice.279 Such discourse of equity, justice, and individual rights in
America masks the prevailing social structures of domination and
disempowerment of certain members of American society, such as
women and racial and ethnic minorities, and helps deflect calls for
reform to the American justice system.280
272. See id. at 595-606.
273. Id. at 614-15.
274. See id
275. See id. at 614-18.
276. See id. at 615-21.
277. See id at 629-33.
278. See Kessler, supra note 251, at 130.
279. Id.
280. Id
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Third, comparativists play a direct ideological and practical role in
constructing and perpetuating a vision of private law as
depoliticized.28 1 Whether in the form of harmonization projects
among developed nations or through private law transplants in the
developing world, such private law constitutes a sort of seemingly a-
political international regime outside the sphere of sovereignty and
traditional international law.282 However, developing a system of
rules to be implemented by the market and commercial actors without
state intervention is itself a governance project.2 83
As feminist critique of the private and the public has demonstrated,
the allocation of certain areas to private law or to public law, the
separation of the market and the family, and the distinction between
intervention and non-intervention in private relations are directly tied
to power relations between men and women and have been a
particularly effective way in which law constructs and perpetuates
power structures within society while appearing as neutral, natural,
and a-political.
In light of the predominance of the public-private dichotomy and of
privacy in legal and social discourse, it is not surprising that the
public-private dichotomy has been central to FLT.284 Feminists have
exposed the ideology inherently embedded in the notion of privacy
and the public-private dichotomy. "Privacy is not a coherent concept
and it does not lead to any indisputable policy choices" writes
Frances Olsen.285  Elsewhere she explains that "'[p]rivate' is not a
natural attribute nor descriptive in a factual sense, but rather is a
political and contestable designation,"2 86 a normative designation of
how things should be treated, fueled and informed by struggles
over power.28 8 Struggles over the meaning of gender and the role of
281. Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 622-29.
282. Id. at 623.
283. Id. at 624.
284. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983).
285. Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 862 n.73 (1985) [hereinafter The Myth].
286. Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private
Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319 (1993) [hereinafter Public/Private
Distinction].
287. Id. at 320 n.2; see also Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) ("[T]he terms 'private' and 'public' occur in various
senses, which are distinct though interrelated . . . these terms typically have both
descriptive and normative meanings.").
288. Public/Private Distinction, supra note 286, at 320.
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men and women in society particularly construe and inform the
public/private divide; men's sphere is the public sphere whereas
women are relegated to the private sphere.28 9
Feminist theories have advanced several lines of critique of the
public/private dichotomy.2 90 Of particular insight to comparativists
are the challenges leveled against the public-private distinction
altogether, arguing that law or the state actually determine what is
public and what is private. Rather than focusing on where and how
we draw the public-private line, some feminist scholars, including
myself, question the public-private dichotomy altogether and reject
the notion of sharp demarcation between public and private.
'Private' and 'public' exist on a continuum." 291
Frances Olsen has consistently argued that the public-private
dichotomy is false and that the state is constantly implicated in the
private sphere.2 92 She illustrates this point by focusing on state
intervention in the family, arguing that the terms intervention and
nonintervention, are largely meaningless. 293 Because the state is
implicated in the formation, functioning, and distribution of power
within the family, it is meaningless to ask whether the state does or
does not intervene in the family.294 On the other hand, the use of the
terms intervention and nonintervention masks the policy choices the
state is making. 29 5 According to Olsen, whichever family status quo
the state chooses to support, its choice is a political choice that
289. Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN's L.J.
47,61 (1997).
290. Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847 (2000).
291. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 977 (1991)
(observing that "[t]here is no realm of personal and family life that exists totally
separate from the reach of the state. The state defines both the family, the so-called
private sphere, and the market, the so-called public sphere."). Similarly, Deborah
Rhode argues that empirically, "[t]he dichotomy of 'separate spheres' has always been
illusory. The state determines what counts as private and what forms of intimacy
deserve public recognition." Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1994). Public opportunities and policies concerning tax, welfare,
and childcare shape private choices just as private family considerations constrain
public participation in the workplace. Id.
292. See The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1508; The Myth, supra note 285, at
842; Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 113 (1989).
293. The Myth, supra note 285, at 842.
294. Id. at 837, 842.
295. See Schneider, supra note 291, at 985 ("Although social failure to respond to
problems of battered women has been justified on grounds of privacy, this failure to
respond is an affirmative political decision that has serious public consequences. The
rationale of privacy masks the political nature of the decision.").
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impacts the family power dynamics.296 Consequently, after exposing
the malleability of the public-private distinction, one comes to the
realization that the state should not be allowed to justify unjust
actions and policies based on an imaginary public-private line.297
Feminist critics have similarly challenged the use of the public-
private divide to dichotomize the home and the family against the
marketplace.29 8 Olsen, for example, focuses on the distinction
between the privateness of families (women 's sphere) and the
publicness of markets (men 's sphere). 299  The dichotomization of
market and family pervades our discourse and our culture to the
extent that we tend to forget that our family and market arrangements
are human creations.3" Thus, we must reject the family-market
dichotomy in order to resolve real conflicts.301
If law and culture then serve to construe both family and market,
serve to define the scope and the line demarcating and differentiating
personal relations from commercial relations, there is nothing
inherently more or less comparable between the different legal
regimes of contracts or property as opposed to family law. Nothing
in the so-called private areas of law that makes them more suitable
for harmonization or transplantation between different legal orders as
opposed to the other aspects of law that seem incomparable, resisting
convergence, because they are within the public sphere of culture and
tradition. Whether engaged in harmonization projects among
industrialized economies or in the export of legal models to the
developing world, comparativists should acknowledge that such
private law is part of the global public agenda and should critically
investigate the implications of forwarding such agenda.
In sum, those engaged in comparative legal studies and in
comparative projects need to be self-critical and recognize the power
relations involved, whether we engage in harmonization and rule of
law projects or in the seemingly mere intellectual projects of
understanding and migration of ideas and legal concepts. It is such
296. The Myth, supra note 285, at 843.
297. Public/Private Distinction, supra note 286, at 324-25.
298. The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1498.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1566. Even more so, the division of the world into separate public and private
spheres facilitates the oppression of women. Especially with regards to the
embodiment of the private sphere in the home and the family, feminists have argued
that privacy doctrine "shelters from state regulation a domain in which women have
unequal power and are physically vulnerable." Higgins, supra note 290, at 850.
301. The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1567-68.
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self-conscious and explicit discourse of the politics of comparative
law and of comparative law (and any law) as political practice, as an
ideology of power, that marks the most important and promising
contribution FLT can make to comparative legal studies.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the last few decades, comparative law and comparative legal
studies have been amidst an existential identity crisis. Often
criticized for lacking in theory, being Euro-centric and doctrinally
oriented, questions abound on whether comparative law is indeed an
independent academic discipline. Furthermore, even if better viewed
as a methodological framework, there is no agreement on how to
engage in comparative legal studies and what methodological tool-kit
is available to the comparative scholar and lawyer. While all over the
world many policy and law reform projects, harmonization projects
and academic research endeavors flourish under the broad umbrella
of comparative legal studies, they most often proceed with very little
theorizing about the nature of the comparisons or consciousness of
the inherent challenges that such comparisons entail.
Similar to comparative law and comparative legal studies, feminist
legal theories have been questioned both externally and from within
on whether they represent a unified discipline with core values and
methods of inquiry; have been challenged on the scope and goals of
feminist inquiries; and have been criticized for being essentialist and
ethnocentric. Rather than shying away from such challenges,
feminists have embraced them as a way to move forward.
Comparative legal scholars and lawyers could similarly benefit from
embracing the multiple purposes of comparative legal studies and
comparative law projects while recognizing shared commonalities.
They could learn from FLT how to broaden the discourse and
approach other legal systems with humility and a genuine interest for
mutual learning of both the foreign system and one's own. They
could particularly learn from FLT how to avoid the extremes of both
ethnocentrism and cultural relativism, thus overcoming the fear of not
being truly able to know the other legal system or to draw meaningful
comparisons based on observed legal similarities and differences.
Feminist jurisprudence about the production of knowledge and
objectivity as epistemology can be similarly helpful for
comparativists. Whereas traditional comparative legal studies present
the juxtaposition of one legal system against another legal system
(often one's home legal system) as an objective neutral scientific
project, feminist jurisprudence exposes such epistemological
standpoint of point of viewlessness as masking implicit biases and
normative standards. Moreover, insights from feminist jurisprudence
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also help shed light on the inherent political dimensions of
comparative legal studies rather than the purported objective
universal assessment of various legal systems and legal rules so often
present in comparative legal scholarship and reform work. As a
matter of methodology, the diversity of feminist legal theories and
the ability to embrace multiple voices and experiences can help
comparative scholars break down the binary discourse of west/rest,
common law/civil law, and so forth. Feminist practices of
perspective-shifting and of seeing ourselves as we see the other can
further allow comparativists to recognize the partiality of their
perspective and acknowledge unstated norms at the base of their
comparisons. Such epistemology and methodology will allow us to
re-engage in comparative legal studies in a way that is better suited to
the era of globalization.
Comparative law can and should move forward strategically in a
transformative way. If comparative legal studies take all these
insights from feminist legal theories seriously and truly build on them
to dismantle entrenched categories and practices, we may be able to
finally realize its ability to "challenge entrenched categorizations and
fundamental assumptions in one's own and others' legal cultures"
and fulfill its true potential for "sharpening, deepening and expanding
the lenses through which one perceives law."302
302. Curran, supra note 78, at 658.
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